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THE CUTLER LECTURES 
Established at the College of William and Mary 
in Virgina by James Goold Cutler 
of Rochester, N. Y. 
The late James Goold Cutler of Rochester, New 
Y or k, in making his generous gift to the endow-
ment of the Marshall-Wythe School of Govern-
ment and Citizenship in the College of William 
and Mary provided, among other things, that one 
lecture should be given at the College in each 
calendar year by some person "who is an out-
standing authority on the Constitution of the 
United States." Mr. Cutler wisely said that it 
appeared to him that the most useful contribution 
he' could make to promote the making of de-
. mocracy safe for the world (to invert President 
Wilson's aphorism) was to promote serious con-
sideration by as many people as possible of cer-
tain points fundamental and therefore vital to 
. the permanency of constitutional government in 
the United States. Mr. Cutler declared as a 
basic proposition that our political system breaks 
down, when and where it fails, because of the 
lack of sound education of the people for whom 
and by whom it was intended to be carried on. 
Mr. Cutler was one of the few eminently suc-
cessful business men who took time from his busy 
life to study constitutional government. As a 
result of his study, he recognized with unusual 
clearness the magnitude of our debt to the 
makers, interpreters and defenders of the Con-
stitution of the United States. 
He was deeply interested in the College of 
William and Mary because he was a student of 
history and knew what great contributions were 
made to the cause of constitutional government 
by men who taught and studied here- Wythe and 
Randolph, Jefferson and Marshall, Monroe and 
Tyler, and a host of others who made this country 
great. He, therefore, thought it peculiarly fitting 
to endow a chair of government here and to pro-
vide for a popular "lecture each year by some 
outstanding authority on the Constitution of the 
United States." 
The third lecturer in the course was Dr. John 
Holladay Latane, member of the staff of the 
Walter Hines Page School of International Re-
lations of the Johns Hopkins University. 
THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 
JOHN HOLLADAY LATANE 
M emher of the Staff of th e Walter Hines Page School of 
Internation al Relations of the Johns Hopkins 
University 
In the first lecture on this foundation the Hon. 
James M. Beck described the Constitution of the 
United States as "a living instrument of govern-
ment" which is "ever changing to meet the ne-
cessities of a changing time and a changing 
people." Of no part of the Constitution is this 
statement truer than of the rather meagre 
clauses containing the grants of power over 
foreign relations. These grants, designed to 
meet the needs of a small isolated republic which 
proposed to stay at home and mind its own 
business, have been enlarged by interpretation to 
cover the activities of a great world power. 
The framers of the Constitution wisely decided 
that the conduct of foreign relations was a federal 
function and delegated it to the central govern-
ment. They also decided that it was an executive 
function and confided it to the President, subject 
to certain checks in accordance with the general 
theory of checks and balances which underlies 
our constitutional system. The main check upon 
the President is the requirement that he must 
obtain the consent of two-thirds of the senators 
present before ratifying a treaty. This provision 
was adopted, as I shall show, to meet a special 
situation, and is at the present time a serious 
obstacle to the proper functioning of the United 
States in the role it is called upon to play in world 
politics. The great expansion of executive power 
and the efforts of the Senate to exercise control 
over foreign policy through the exercise of its 
veto power over treaties are the subjects which 
I propose to develop in the course of this lecture. 
In a federal government, such as ours, the 
control of foreign relations is a delegated power 
and ,must be exercised within constitutional 
limits. It is not regarded as an inherent attribute 
of sovereigntyJ as in most unitary or highly cen-
tralized stat~ In all states having written con-
stitutions, whether federal or unitary, the foreign 
relations power is subject to limitations of some 
sort. Sucp limitations are usually greater in 
federal than in unitary states, and they are 
usually greater in federations formed by the 
union of pre-existing states, such as ours, than 
in federal states created more or less artificially 
for the purpose of decentralizing administration, 
such as certain of the South American republics. 
In most federations the control of foreign affain 
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is intrusted to the central government and denied 
to the states, though in some instances, such as 
Germany and Switzerland, the member states 
retain the right to make treaties, practically 
limited, it would seem, to the regulation of 
frontier matters. The members of the Germar. 
Reich retain the further right of legation, that is: 
they may send and receive foreign ministers. 
In the Constitution of the United States the 
control of foreign relations is delegated to the 
federal government and denied to the states. 
The grant of this power is not found in anyone 
section of the Constitution and when the scat-
tered sections expressly delegating it are collected 
the power does not seem altogether adequate, 
but under the doctrine of implied powers the 
grants of the foreign relations power have proved 
to be quite extensive and on the whole sufficient) 
Postponing for the moment the powers given to 
the President and Senate, we find that articleI,sec-
tion 8, gives Congress the power to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations; to define and punish 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, 
and offences against the law of nations; to declare 
war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and 
make rules concerning captures on land and 
water; to maintain and make rules for the govern-
ment of the army and navy; and to legislate on 
the subject of immigration and naturalization. 
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Article I, section 10, declares that, "No State 
shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Con-
federation; grant letters of marque and reprisal ;" 
lay duties on imports or exports, without the 
consent of Congress; and finally, "No State shall, 
without the consent of Congress, lay any duty 
of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time 
of peace, enter into any agreement or compact 
with another State, or with a foreign Power, or 
engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such 
imminent danger as will not admit of delay." 
One of the strangest omissions in the Constitu-
tion, in view of the subsequent course of Ameri-
can expansion, was the failure to authorize the 
acquisition of new territory. Article IV, section 
3, provides that, 
New States may be admitted by the Congress 
into this Union; but no new State shall be formed 
or erected within the jurisdiction of any other 
State; nor any State be formed by the junction 
of two or more States, or parts of States, without 
the consent of the legislatures of the States con-
cerned as well as of the Congress. 
It is evident, I think, that in adopting this sec-
tion the members of the convention had in mind 
the thirteen original states and the Northwest 
Territory. President Jefferson, as a strict con-
structionist, hesitated to annex the vast Louisiana 
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territory without a special constitutional amend-
ment, but he was urged by Livingston and 
Monroe to hasten the ratification of the purchase 
treaty lest Napoleon should change his mind. So 
Jefferson sacrificed his constitutional scruples on 
the altar of expediency. It remained for his great 
political antagonist John Marshall to find con-
stitutional justification for this and other an-
nexations under the doctrine of implied powers. 
In a case involving the validity of the annexa-
tion of Florida, Chief Justice Marshall declared: 
The Constitution confers absolutely on the 
government of the Union the powers of making 
war, and of making treaties; consequently the 
government possesses the power of acquiring ter-
ritory either by conquest or by treaty. 
If the government has the power to acquire 
territory by conquest or by treaty, it would ap-
pear to have the power to cede territory as the 
result of an unsuccessful war. Fortunately such 
a contingency has never arisen. The question 
has, however, been discussed on several occasions, 
notably in connection with the Webster-Ashbur-
ton Treaty, which settled the Maine-New Bruns-
wick boundary dispute by a compromise giving 
Great Britain territory claimed by the state of 
Maine. During the negotiations the Maine and 
l'vl assachusetts legislatures passed resolutions de-
claring that no power was delegated to the na-
[ 9 ] 
tional government to cede territory within a state 
without its consent. Webster wrote to the gov-
ernor of Maine: 
Although I entertain not the slightest doubt 
of the power of the government to settle this 
question by compromise as well as in any other 
way, I suppose it will not be prudent to stir in 
the direction of compromise without the consent 
of Maine. 
On the promise of Webster to pay to Maine 
and Massachusetts the sum of $150,000 each, 
plus an equal division of "the disputed territory 
fund" which Great Britain was to hand over to 
the United States, the commissioners of Maine 
and Massachusetts agreed to accept the com-
promise and their senators voted in favor of the 
ratification of the treaty. The peculiar feature 
of the transaction was that the agreement to 
make these payments was incorporated in the 
fifth article of the treaty with Great Britain. 
Lord Ashburton at first objected to this stipula-
tion as a matter with which his government had 
no concern, but when Webster explained that 
this was the only way to insure the votes of 
those states in the Senate for ratification he 
withdrew his obj ection. Webster later referred 
to these payments as bribes to secure ratification. 
If the United States should ever be so unfor-
tunate as to be compelled to cede part of the 
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territory of a state as the result of a military 
defeat, it is hardly conceivable that the Supreme 
Court would declare the treaty making the ces-
sion unconstitutional. It would probably regard 
it as a political act not subject to judicial review. 
The annexation of territory by joint resolution 
of the two Houses of Congress is an illustration 
of how the Constitution may be stretched by 
interpretation. The first case was that of Texas. 
Unable to secure the necessary two-thirds vote 
in the Senate for the ratification of a treaty of 
annexation, President Tyler resorted to a joint 
resolution, which requires only a majority vote, 
the justification for such a method being that 
Texas was to be admitted as a State and that 
Congress had the power to admit new states to 
the Union. Half a century later when the Senate 
refused to ratify a treaty providing for the an-
nexation of the Hawaiian Islands, the problem 
was again solved by joint resolution based on the 
Texas precedent. It was a false analogy, how-
ever, for there was no intention of admitting the 
Hawaiian Islands to statehood. 
When we come to consider the President's 
owers over foreign relations we find the express 
grants in the Constitution very meagre. Article 
II, section 2, makes him the commander-in-chief 
of the army and navy. The same section pro-
vides that 
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He shall have power, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, pro-
vided two-thirds of the Senators present concur ; 
and he shall nominate, and,by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, shall appoint am-
bassadors, other public ministers and consuls, 
judges of the Supreme Court, and all other of-
ficers of the United States, whose appointments 
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by law. 
Section 3 contains the very important clause: 
"he shall receive ambassadors and other public 
ministers." This gives him the sole right to 
recognize new governments or new states, or to 
withhold recognition. 
The President's very extensive powers in the 
conduct of foreign relations are, however, not 
derived from specific grants, but from the fact 
that he is vested with the executive power and 
that he is the only channel of communication 
between the United States and foreign nations. 
The Constitution simply declares that, "The 
executive power shall be vested in a President 
of the United States of America." It does not 
undertake to define the extent of this power, 
though it does place limits upon it in certain 
cases, as in the making of treaties. J Early in 
Washington's administration the question was 
raised as to the scope of the President's powers 
in foreign relations and Jefferson as Secretary of 
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State was called upon to prepare an opmlOn. 
This he did with great care and his conclusion 
was as follows: 
The transaction of business with foreign na-
tions is executive altogether. It belongs, then, 
to the head of that department, except as to such 
portions of it as are especially submitted to the 
Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly. 
In this opinion] efferson referred toClhe Senate 
as the only check on the executive in the conduct 
of foreign relations, but it should not be over-
looked that the House of Representatives has 
always claimed a share in the treaty-making 
power in cases where a treaty requires a money 
appropriation for its execution. The Constitu-
tion gives Congress the exclusive power to ap-
propriate money:') Does a treaty, constitutionally 
negotiated and ratified, which involves a money 
payment, constitute an absolute obligation? Our 
answers to this question have not always been 
consistent. When the French Chamber of Depu-
ties failed to appropriate money for the payments 
due under the treaty of 1831 in settlement of the 
famous "Spoliation Claims," Secretary of State 
Livingston presented the case to the French 
government in the following rather emphatic 
language: 
The government of the United States presumes 
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that whenever a treatv has been concluded and 
ratified by the ackno~ledged authorities compe-
tent for that purpose, an obligation is thereby 
imposed upon each and every department of the 
government to carry it into complete effect, ac-
cording to its terms, and that on the performance 
of this obligation consists the due observance of 
good faith among nations. 
President Jackson pushed this case to the point 
of an actual rupture of diplomatic relations with 
France, but Great Britain acted as mediator and 
the French Chamber finally voted the appropria-
tion. 
President Jackson and Secretary Livingston 
on this occasion took the international point of 
view. The House of Representatives, however, 
has upon more than one occasion insisted on its 
constitutional rights. In 1796 and again in 1871 
it resolved that: 
When a treaty stipulates regulations on any 
of the subjects submitted by the Constitution to 
the power of Congress, it must depend for its 
execution as to such stipulations on a law or laws 
to be passed by Congress; and it is in the con-
stitutional right . and duty of the House of Rep-
resentatives in all such cases to deliberate on 
the expediency or inexpediency of carrying such 
treaty into effect and to determine and act 
thereon, as in their judgment may be most con-
ducive to the public good. 
[ 14 ] 
Treaties which require for their execution 
legislative action on the part of the member 
states of a federation are sometimes signed sub-
ject to such action, in which case they are under-
stood to be mere recommendations. For in-
stance, in the treaty of peace of 1783 with Eng-
land it was agreed that Congress should earnestly 
recommend to the legislatures of the respective 
states the restoration of the confiscated estates 
of Tories. Although the American commission-
ers warned the British commissioners that the 
states would probably not carry out this recom-
mendation, the British government later alleged 
the failure of the states to make restitution to the 
Tories as one of the reasons for not carrying out 
some of its treaty obligations. 
The Labor Organization of the League of Na-
tions deals with subjects that lie outside the 
range of federal powers and within the compe-
tence of local legislation. Foreseeing the diffi-
culties that might arise the framers of the Treaty 
of Versailles expressly provided that, 
In the case of a federal state whose power to 
enter into conventions on labor matters is subj ect 
to limitations, its government may treat a draft 
convention as a recommendation only. 
As a matter of practice conventions drafted 
under the auspIces of the Labor Organization 
[ 15 ] 
which require legislative action are not signed 
by the delegates, but are submitted to the states 
participating as recommendations. The fact that 
labor legislation is a matter of state control in 
the United States has caused the Labor Organiza.:. 
tion of the League to be very unfavorably re-
garded in this country. 
Treaties limiting the size of navies, such as 
those adopted by the Washington Conference 
and the London Naval Conference, might be 
considered to deprive Congress of its discretion-
ary right "to provide and maintain a navy," but 
even if the House of Representatives should pass 
an appropriation exceeding the treaty stipula-
tions, it is hardly conceivable that such a meas-
ure should pass the Senate wh~ch ratified the 
treaty or escape the veto of the President who 
negotiated it. It is of course possible that a 
Senate whose personnel has changed and a sub-
sequent President might agree to disregard such 
a treaty, but this is unlikely because such treaties 
are limited to a relatively brief term of years. 
The President, who is the sole channel of com-
munication between the United States and for-
eign nations and whose powers in this connection 
are so great, has a dual responsibility. He is 
subject, on the one hand, to the limitations of 
the national constitution from which he derives 
his powers, and, on the other hand, as the rep-
r 16 ] 
resentative of the nation before the world, he 
must recognize his international responsibilities 
and act in accordance with the standards of in-
ternationallaw. It is difficult at times to recon-
cile these two points of view. International law 
is recognized by the Constitution in the clause ) 
giving Congress the power "to define and punish 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, 
and offences against the Law of Nations," and 
our courts, following the precedents of the Eng-
lish courts, have always recognized international 
law as a part of the law of the land. As a member 
of the family or community of nations we are 
bound by the law of nations, although we have 
not yet accepted membership in the League of 
Nations. Of course if Congress should pass a 
law in direct conflict with a rule of international 
law our courts and the executive would have to 
follow the act of Congress, but John Marshall 
at an early period announced the principle, which 
the Supreme Court has time and again reiterated, 
that, "an act of Congress should never be con-
strued to violate the law of nations if any other 
possible construction remains." If Congress de-
liberately intends to violate a rule of intern a-
tionallaw or a treaty obligation the country must 
stand the consequences if the inj ured nation is 
strong enough to resent it. 
During the hundred and forty-odd years that 
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have elapsed since the Constitution was adopted 
the control of foreign affairs has become more 
and more centered in the hands of the President. 
The principal check upon his authority is the 
veto power of the Senate in the making of treaties, 
which with the important role now played by the 
United States in world politics has become a 
subject of heated controversy. Many treaties of 
a formal character go through the Senate without 
serious discussion or opposition, but on a vital 
question of foreign policy it is usually impossible 
for the President to command the constitutional 
two-thirds vote necessary for ratification. He is 
thus seriously handicapped in the carrying out 
of his policies. As a result of the long term of 
service senators can and frequently do ignore 
public opinion. For instance, it seems evident 
that fof' some time the great majbrity of the 
American people have wanted to see the United 
States take its place in the World Court, and yet 
notwithstanding this fact and the earnest recom-
mendations of two Presidents, whose party had 
a large majority in the Senate, that body has 
quibbled over technical points of minor signifi-
cance and refused to lend the great moral support 
of the United States to one of the most hopefu l 
agencies for the promotion of world peace. 
Had the framers of the Constitution required 
merely a majority vote of the Senate for ratifica-
[ 18 ] 
tion, or a majority of both the Senate and the 
House, propositions which were considered by 
the convention, the President would have a sport-
ing chance to carry out his policies. The two-
thirds requirement was adopted to meet a par-
ticular situation. In 1785 John Jay, who was 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had asked the 
Congress of the Confederation for authority to 
suspend for a term of years, in return for com-
mercial concessions from Spain, the right of 
citizens of the United States to navigate the 
Mississippi River. The eastern and middle states 
voted for Jay's proposal, while the delegates from 
the southern states voted solidly against it. The 
right to navigate the Mississippi River to the Gulf 
was a matter of vital concern to the people of the 
south and west, and the vote of the eastern and 
middle states to abandon it, even temporarily, 
created great indignation. Fortunately Jay was 
unable to come to terms with Spain even on the 
basis proposed. 
When the question of control of the treaty-
making power came up in the federal convention 
two years later the Mississippi question figured 
in the debate and in order to guard against the 
possible sacrifice of territory or rights in the 
southwest the southern members insisted that no 
treaty should be ratified without the consent of 
two-thirds of the members of the Senate present. 
[ 19 ] 
The World War and the peace negotiations at 
Paris raised no more difficult or fundamental 
question than that of the control of foreign rela-
tions under representative or democratic forms 
of government. The problem was not confined 
to the United States, although there the spec-
tacular fight between the President and the 
Senate attracted world-wide attention and had 
disastrous results. To the great majority of 
Americans the issue was new, because in only 
two cases had the Senate ever before discussed 
a treaty in open session. The senatorial op-
position to the Treaty of Versailles was, there-
fore, attributed to the alleged autocratic methods 
and personal peculiarities of President Wilson. 
The public did not know that the Senate's jeal-
ousy of the executive in the field of foreign rela-
tions was as old as the government itself, that 
upon one occasion President Washington went 
to the Senate with the project of a treaty in his 
hands for the purpose of seeking the constitu-
tional "advice and consent" of that body, that 
the Senate referred his communication to a com-
mittee and declined to discuss it in his presence, 
and that as he left the chamber he muttered in 
audible tones that "he would be damned if he 
ever went there again." 
Anyone who imagines that the contest between 
the President and the Senate for the control of 
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foreign policy began with the administration of 
Woodrow Wilson would do well to read John 
Hay's letters. The contest reached an acute 
stage during Roosevelt's first administration over 
the compulsory arbitration treaties negotiated by 
Hay, which were amended qy the Senate so as 
to require . the submission of each case to the 
Senate for approval. Roosevelt considered this 
as a nullification of the compulsory feature and 
refused to ratify the treaties as amended. The 
Senate had been aroused by Roosevelt's negotia-
tions with the Dominican Republic, of which 
they disapproved. When the treaty providing 
for the appointment by the President of a re-
ceiver of Dominican customs failed to receive 
the consent of the Senate, Roosevelt ignored that 
body and carried out his policy of financial super-
vision under a modus vivendi until the Senate 
finally acquiesced and ratified the treaty in 
amended form. During the discussion over the 
arbitration treaties Secretary Hay expressed his 
opinion of the Senate in caustic letters to his 
friends. He declared that thirty-four per ceni 
of the Senate would "always be found on thr 
blackguard side of every question" that came 
before them, and that he did not believe that 
another important treaty would ever be ratified 
by that body, He also said: "A treaty entering 
the Senate is like a bull going into the arena: 
[ 21 ] 
/ 
no one can say just how or when the final blow 
will fall-but one thing is certain-it will never 
leave the arena alive." 
President Cleveland once referred in charac-
teristic phraseology to "the customary disfigure-
ment which treaties undergo at the hands of the 
United States Senate." In fact it has long been 
a habit of the Senate to amend treaties or attach 
reservations to them, frequently for no other 
apparent reason than to assert the authority of 
that body or to create the impression that the 
executive has bungled matters and that better 
results would have been obtained had the Senate 
been consulted or had a share in the negotiation. 
Since the Spanish War the Senate has gone a 
long way toward securing the right to be repre-
sented in the negotiation of important treaties 
in addition to its right of advice and consent in 
the question of ratification. At the close of the 
Spanish War President McKinley appointed a 
commission of five members, three of whom were 
senators, to negotiate a treaty of peace. The 
senators were William P. Frye, president pro 
tem of the Senate, Cushman K. Davis, chairman 
of the foreign relations committee, both Republi-
cans, and George Gray, the leading Democratic 
member of the committee. This was regarded 
as a shrewd but questionable innovation on the 
part of .President McKinley. It undoubtedly 
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enabled him to secure the consent of the Senate 
to ratification, but the appointment of senators 
as negotiators called forth protests and criti-
cisms. Senator Hoar maintained that the par-
ticipation of members of the Senate in the ne-
gotiation of a treaty would prevent impartial 
consideration of that treaty when it came up for 
ratification. 
In selecting commissioners for the peace con-
ference at Paris President Wilson did not follow 
President McKinley's example, and much of the 
opposition to the Treaty of Versailles was due 
to the fact that the President did not take Senator 
Lodge or any of his colleagues to Paris. Presi-
dent Harding reverted to the McKinley prece-
dent and appointed Senator Lodge, chairman of 
the foreign relations committee, and Senator 
Underwood, the Democratic leader of the Senate, 
as members of the delegation to the Washington 
Conference of 1922; and President Hoover ap-
pointed Senator Reed, Republican, and Senator 
Robinson, the Democratic leader, as delegates to 
the London Naval Conference of 1930. Both 
treaties were promptly ratified. 
The Senate advanced another claim in con-
nection with the London Naval Treaty. It de-
manded that all the correspondence leading up 
to the treaty be laid before it. Secretary Stim-
son replied that all essential information had 
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been transmitted, but that it would seriously 
embarrass our relations with other powers to 
make public all notes and cablegrams that had 
been exchanged. President Hoover refused, 
therefore, to comply with the request of the 
Senate. Senator Reed did not help the situation 
by assuring his colleagues that as a delegate he 
had examined all the correspondence and coul d 
vouch that it was all right. This raised the ques-
tion as to whether one senator was entitled to 
more information than his colleagues. If the 
Senate should establish as a principle the right 
to have all correspondence relating to a treaty 
before giving its consent to ratification, it would 
gain nothing, for our diplomats would soon learn 
not to commit to writing anything relating to a 
private or confidential conversation, in which 
case the texts of treaties would be submitted with 
even less information than the Senate now gets. 
In rejecting the Treaty of Versailles the Senate 
won what is likely to prove a fruitless victory. 
That body, so jealous of its rights, already ap-
pears to have been short-circuited. It has kept 
us out of the League of Nations, but it has not 
kept us out of European politics. The executive 
has already found a way of dispensing with its 
"advice and consent" by handling delicate and 
important matters "unofficially." In order to 
win in 1920 the Republican party indiscrimi-
~ 24 ] 
nately repudiated the great achievements of 
Woodrow Wilson and proclaimed so loudly a 
return to the isolation of the "founding fathers" 
that when they assumed the responsibilities of 
office they found themselves hampered at every 
turn by the reactionary views which they had 
disseminated among the people. Secretary 
Hughes extricated himself from this situation to 
some extent by the device of sending "observers" 
to European conferences and soon built up a 
system of "unofficial diplomacy." His part in 
the adjustment of the reparations question was 
"unofficial," though none the less effective. 
Upon several occasions he set forth the ad-
vantages of this sort of irregular co-operation 
with Europe over membership in the League of 
Nations. In an address before the N ew York State 
Republican convention in 1924 he said that if 
Congress had been asked to authorize executive 
action in conferences such as had been taking 
place in Europe from time to time, "the Congress 
itself most probably would reserve the authority 
to give instructions, and you can well imagine 
what the debate would be and what the instruc-
tions would be." 
Just after the London Conference of 1924, 
which gave effect to the Dawes Report, Secretary 
Hughes, who had visited London, Paris, and 
Berlin in the effort to put the Dawes plan 
[ 25 ] 
through, said before the Society of Pilgrims in 
London: 
Without wishing to say anything controversial 
on this occasion, I may give it as my conviction 
that had we attempted to make America's con-
tribution to the recent plan of adjustment a 
governmental matter, we should have been in-
volved in a hopeless debate, and there would 
have been no adequate action. We should have 
been beset with demands, objections, instruc-
tions. 
However effective this method of procedure 
may be, it is anything but democratic. It is in 
line with secret, not open, diplomacy. 
Wilson and Lloyd George both undertook to 
bring foreign relations under democratic control. 
It is not yet possible to determine how far they 
succeeded. Notwithstanding the ridicule heaped 
upon the expression "open covenants openly ar-
rived at," it cannot be denied that a new order 
of diplomacy was introduced by the World War. 
The main difference between the old diplomacy 
and the new is frequently said to be the differ-
ence between the transaction of business by pro-
fessional diplomats in the privacy of chancelleries 
and the drafting of agreements at public confer-
ences in the full glare of publicity. This differ-
ence is more superficial than real, for experience 
has shown that unless the way has been carefully 
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prepared in advance for such conferences, little 
is accomplished. What is actually done is usu-
ally agreed on beforehand and only the results 
announced in plenary sessions. This was true 
of the Paris Conference, where all important 
questions were determined in private by the Big 
Four. 
The same general method of procedure was 
followed by the Washington Conference of 1922 
and the recent London Naval Conference. In-
deed it is difficult to see what other procedure 
could be followed. Nevertheless the interna-
tional conference serves to focus public attention 
on important questions about which the public 
knows little and formulates issues for submis-
sion to the final verdict of public opinion. Fur-
thermore it is impossible for the agreements 
reached at a conference to be kept secret. As 
a matter of fact all secret compacts have been 
invalidated by the Covenant of the League, so 
that open diplomacy has made great gains. With 
the modern machinery of communication and 
the various agencies of publicity that now exist 
it is inconceivable that the old order should re-
turn or that public opinion should ever cease to 
be the force that it has become in international 
affairs. 
The policy of European governments with re-
spect to the publication of foreign office archives 
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and current information has been revolutionized 
as a result of the World War. Documents which 
under the old regime would have been kept 
secret for a generation or more are now available 
in print. Strange to say, this demand for pub-
licity in international affairs has so far met with 
little response in the United States. Professor 
Manley Hudson's report submitted to the Con-
ference of Teachers of International Law in April, 
1928, shows that our government supplies less 
information to the public on current interna-
tional affairs than that of any of the great powers. 
Mr. Hughes, in commenting on the report, re-
marked facetiously that a delay of eleven years 
in the publication of the last volume of "Foreign 
Relations" tended to take the edge off of criti-
Cism. 
The requirement of the two-thirds vote in the 
ratification of treaties, which gives the veto power 
to thirty-four per cent of the senators present, 
. is a serious handicap on the executive. In order 
to overcome it successive Presidents have de-
veloped to an amazing extent the discretionary 
powers of the executive under the general doc-
trine that the conduct of foreign relations is an 
executive prerogative. The fact that the Presi-
dent is the sole channel of communication with 
foreign nations 'gives him, of course, a great ad-
vantage in the development of his powers. It 
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enables him to take the initiative in formulating 
foreign policies, and it is worthy of comment 
that all of our distinctive foreign policies have 
been formulated and announced by Presidents. 
The Senate obstructs, but it does not initiate. 
The President, as already stated, has an un-
limited discretion in the recognition of new gov-
ernments and new states. In the negotiation of 
treaties and in the transaction of other impor-
tant business he may use special agents, of un-
certain diplomatic status, who are appointed and 
sent abroad without the consent of the Senate: 
President Wilson's employment of Colonel House 
as his personal representative in Europe before 
and during the World War was not an innova-
tion, though it was the most conspicuous instance 
of the kind. H. M. Wriston, in his recent book, 
Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations, 
shows that Colonel House had over four hundred 
predecessors, that all of our Presidents had made 
use of special agents appointed without the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate. Such temporary 
use of special agents does not constitute appoint-
ment to office within the meaning of the Con-
stitution, because the courts have held that an 
office carries with it the idea of permanency and 
must be created by law. Such agents have fre-
quently been given the rank of minister or am-
bassador, but this does not make them ministers 
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or ambassadors within the meaning of the claust 
of the Constitution requiring the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Thus when President 
Wilson sent Mr. Root at the head of a special 
mission to Russia he gave him the rank of am-
bassador, but did not submit his name to the 
Senate, for the appointment was temporary and 
did not create an office. 
Presidents have frequently made agreements 
with other nations of the nature of treaties, but, 
under the disguise of some other term, such as 
protocol or modus vivendi, have put them into 
effect without the consent of the Senate. 
Although Congress is given the power to de-
clare war, the President has developed the power 
to make war. The war-making power which the 
President has gradually taken to himself is de-
rived, according to Professor Corwin (The Pr.csi-
dent's Control of Foreign R elations, p. 206), 
largely from two sources: 
First, from the coalescence which took place 
at the time of the Civil War between the Presi-
dent's agency in the enforcement of laws and his 
power as commander-in-chief of the army and 
navy; secondly, from our proximity to weak 
disorderly neighbors, who demand rough hand-
ling occasionally but are rarely worth a real 
war. 
The right of the President to land marines or 
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other armed forces on foreign soil for the purpose 
of protecting the lives and property of American 
citizens, to which Professor Corwin has reference 
in the passage just quoted, is fortified by a long 
line of precedents dating back to an early period 
of our history. There are nearly a hundred cases 
in which marines have been actually l'anded on 
foreign soil in various parts of the world and 
many more cases in which they have been dis-
patched to the scene of disorders but not actually 
landed. In most of the cases in which marines 
have been landed the local government was in 
abeyance or unable to afford protection, but in 
recent years the marines have occasionally been 
used for political purposes, that is, to support a 
government or faction to which the President 
had extended recognition. Such was the case in 
President Coolidge's intervention in Nicaragua. 
Marines were landed at the request of Diaz who 
had been recognized by the United States and 
they waged war against Sandino and his forces. 
It was war de facto, but not war de jure, because 
it was not waged against a recognized govern-
ment and therefore did not require a declaration 
of war by Congress. The same was true of the 
Archangel expedition against the Bolshevist re-
gime in Russia, in which the United States par-
ticipated. There was heavy fighting, but no war 
in the constitutional or international sense be-
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cause the Bolshevist government had not been 
recognized. 
There is no constitutional check upon the dis-
cretionary power of the President in such mat-
ters, but the power should be exercised cautiously 
and subject to political scrutiny. It would be 
perfectly possible for the President to withdraw 
recognition from the existing government of a 
Caribbean or Central American state, recognize 
some claimant to executive power who would be 
a mere puppet in the hands of the Department 
of State, and with the consent of the government 
thus set up land marines for the nominal pro-
tection of the lives and property of foreigners, and 
crush the opposition. Such a course would be un-
warranted political intervention and not mere in-
terposition for the protection of foreign lives and 
property. Mr. Hughes undertook at the Havana 
Conference to draw this distinction between inter-
vention and interposition, but the distinction is 
difficult to maintain in practice. It is always 
possible to allege danger to the lives and property 
of American citizens as an excuse for landing 
marines and the President may go a step further 
and back the faction which he considers more 
favorable to the enterprises of Americans and 
therefore more likely to afford them protection. 
The use of armed forces for the protection of 
American citizens and their interests abroad has 
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not been confined to Latin America. The most 
striking instance of the President's assumption 
of the war-making power was President Mc-
Kinley's dispatch of troops to China at the time 
of the Boxer uprising. Without any authoriza-
tion from Congress he ordered over fifteen thou-
sand troops to China. Between five and six 
thousand of these arrived in time to participate 
in the expedition to Peking for the relief of the 
legations. In co-operation with British, French, 
Russian, and Japanese contingents they stormed 
the walled city of Tientsin and fought their way 
to Peking. 
The Chinese government was forced to concede 
the demands of the powers, which included a 
large indemnity and the guarantee of improved 
relations, both commercial and political, with 
foreigners. These and other demands were em-
bodied in the Protocol of 1901. Strange to say, 
this treaty, although published in the official 
collection of the treaties of the United States and 
still in force, was never submitted to the Senate 
for its approval. The only explanation I have 
ever heard advanced for the failure of the Presi-
dent to secure the advice and consent of the 
Senate to this treaty is that while it imposed 
obligations on Chinia, it imposed none on the 
United States. 
In his first annual message to Congress, in 
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December, 1929, President Hoover stated that 
we still had 1600 marines in Nicaragua, 700 in 
Haiti, and 2605 in China. These are the latest 
official figures I have seen. 
It will thus be seen that the President has 
almost unlimited discretionary powers in the 
general conduct of foreign relations. He may 
not, however, bind the nation to definite obliga-
tions and responsibilities without the consent of 
the Senate, and the Senate is exceedingly jealous 
of the President's powers and not immediately 
responsive to public opinion. How to de-
mocratize the Senate, or overcome in some other 
way the handicap which the two-thirds require-
ment places on the President, is a problem for 
which no practical solution has so far been pro-
posed. The Senate is not likely to consent to 
a constitutional amendment which would in any 
way weaken its veto power. It has not been 
possible within the limits of this lecture to dis-
cuss the highly technical question as to whether' 
the treaty-making power, when constitutionally 
exercised by the President and Senate, is subject 
to constitutional limitations. In view of the fact 
that there are no express limitations and that the 
Supreme Court has never declared a treaty un-
constitutional, the view is sometimes advanced 
that the requirement of a two-thirds vote for 
ratification is the only safeguard against the 
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abuse of the treaty-making power and therefore 
should never be dispensed with. To those of us 
who wish to see the United States playa dignified 
role in world affairs and assume the responsi-
bilities that its position as a world power naturally 
involves, the present situation is highly unsatis-
factory. The speeches made in the Senate in 
recent years in opposition to presidential foreign 
policies have too often been appeals not to the 
intelligence of fellow senators or to the public 
at large, but to the prej udices of particular con-
stituencies. This is one of the inevitable results 
of considering treaties in open session. 
The United States already holds the balance 
of world power in its hands and is actively par-
ticipating in world politics, however much the 
government may attempt to conceal that fact 
from the public. But can we continue in-
definitely to claim a voice in world affairs unless 
we are willing to assume our share of responsi-
bility for the maintenance of world peace? The 
Senate is insistent enough on our rights, but 
very indifferent to our responsibilities. Can the 
nations of Europe, for instance, afford to make 
any material reduction in armaments, naval or 
military, until they know whether we will permit 
them to punish an aggressor, or whether under 
the plea of neutral rights we will continue to 
trade with a nation which has violated its in-
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ternational obligations? To this question we 
have given no answer, because no treaty pro-
viding in advance for such a contingency would 
stand any chance of being ratified by the Senate. 
The Senate moves slowly, but in the long run it 
is responsive to public opinion. Hence the only 
solution of the problem presented in this lecture 
would seem to be the development of a well 
informed intelligent public opinion on interna-
tional questions. This cannot come to pass until 
the Department of State adopts a more demo-
cratic policy in the matter of publicity. A great 
many of the criticisms of the executive in ques-
tions of foreign policy are due to lack of full 
information. If we believe in democracy and in 
popular education, we can look forward as we 
gain experience to a more harmonious adjust-
ment of the control of foreign relations. 
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